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Government by Private Groups
W. Willard Wirtz*
I.
The attitude of a successful democracy's citizens toward
their government is a strange alloy of affection and suspicion, of
confidence and of fear. It is said proudly that government is of,
by and for the people, but it is added quickly that the less of it
there is the better. We think of ourselves as being "self governed," as having developed elective and legislative processes
which assure a responsiveness of government to the popular
will; yet in our reactions to the acts of "the Government" we
seem almost to endow it with an anthropomorphic personality,
ascribing to it interests antagonistic to our own.
Our attacks upon legislation we dislike rarely recognize it
as the embodiment by duly elected representatives of majority
sentiments with which we may as individuals disagree. It is our
habit rather to conjure up a picture of malevolent, despotical
lawmakers inspired wholly by the shades of Karl Marx or Niccolo
Machiavelli. Those men and women who administer "the Government's" laws are presumed to be disloyal, dishonest and lazy
until proven innocent. Those, on the other hand, who drill or find
loopholes in these laws are hailed as Davids who have bested
the Goliath of government. And with our every decision to
expand the functions of government in our own behalf there
develops increased criticism of its benevolence. Loyalty becomes,
in a democracy, an ineffable blend of obedience and contumacy,
of allegiance and disaffection.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
This paper was delivered at Louisiana State University as one of a series
which constituted the 1952 Edward Douglass White lectures. It has been
subsequently revised to some extent for present purposes, although not
enough to give It, apart from the other papers in the original series, even its

hoped for meaningfulness. The fact that fewer footnotes have been included
than law review custom dictates is explained partly by limitations of space,
partly by a feeling that the custom has become subject to abuse. What
appears necessary to the development (or questioning) of the central theme
has been included in the text. Anything apparently justified only as a testament to the author's industry and accuracy has been removed from the footnotes. What remains in finer type is largely acknowledgement of fuller
treatments of particular points which the text only summarizes. The entire
lecture series will eventually be published by the Louisiana State University Press.
[440]
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Much of this seeming paradox of attitudes derives of course
from the basic democratic devotion to the ideal of individual
freedom. More specifically, it is an incident of our awareness
that the greatest threat to individual freedom lies in the corruptibility of the power people delegate to the agencies which
govern them.
We consider freedom, to be sure, as something more than
freedom "from government." Particular freedoms are obviously
products of the restrictions we place by law upon ourselves and
our neighbors, and much of the fabric of democratic freedom is
woven of wholly volitional applications of the Golden Rule. Recognition of the "from" freedoms (from want and fear) along
with the traditional "of" freedoms (such as speech and religion)
constitutes acknowledgement of government's affirmative participation in this area.
Yet the fact remains that democracy's distinguishing characteristic, setting it off from other doctrines which pretend to
similar objectives, is that it counts the group force which is concentrated in government the greatest potential despoiler of
individual liberties. So it is that our basic ground rules for freedom, those which are spelled out in the Constitution, guarantee
protection solely against the actions of government. Only governmental agencies are required to accord "due process" and are
prohibited from invading, for example, a man's freedom to speak.
If he loses his job, his corporate directorship, his union card, or
his pastorate because his associates do not like what he says he
finds no legal protection. Yet if his harangue from a modest
platform in Union Square is interrupted by a policeman or if a
city council prevents his playing religious phonograph records on
other people's porches, the Supreme Court of the Nation will
investigate these tamperings with the constitutional cornerstones
of freedom.
To any suggestion that this preoccupation with governmental
threats to liberty is a mistake, we find sufficient answer in the
tragedies which have overtaken those peoples who have been less
vigilant than we in fighting the habit-forming, potentially malignant, effects of government. Its power has fed on their freedoms
until those who were the creators of government have become
its creatures. There is in these experiences full confirmation of
our belief that the group force created by people's delegation of
little pieces of their own authority as individuals is the most
treacherous force in society.
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Yet today, despite our self-satisfactions, we are beginning to
wonder-not whether we have viewed the group force of government with too great suspicion, but whether we have erred in
assuming that the power of such force may prove wanton only
when it is delegated to "governmental" agencies. The image of
the potential corrupters of this kind of power has included only
the "public" agencies of the nation, state and municipality. Yet
today it is being pressed upon us in ever new and sometimes
unpleasant ways that quite a lot of the control over our affairs as
individuals has passed into the hands of a variety of "private"
agencies-agencies which also find their source of power in the
authority given them by large groups of people. We are looking
more and more intently at billion dollar corporations, million
member labor unions, powerful trade (and medical and bar)
associations, growing cooperatives, influential veterans associations, churches that are entering politics, and newspapers that
have bought up all competitors.
There is no more deep-rooted tradition than that which places
all such organizations on the "private" side of the democratic
equation. They are all called, in the law, "private associations,"
and corporations have been expressly held to be "persons" within
the constitutional phrase. It was as the heads of corporate empires that men of an earlier generation won great respect as
"rugged individualists." Labor unions have come to be considered, along with corporations (although not by them), as the
very bastions of "free enterprise." Church and State have been
divorced by the stern mandate of bitter experience, and freedom
of the press from any suggestion of governmental interference
is a byword of democracy. The American Legion and the Daughters of the American Revolution and the Elks and the Moose are
the very embodiment, in our thinking, of our privilege as individuals to choose our own company. It is a basic assumption in
American traditions and emotions that any group power other
than that which funnels through the public election booths is
part of democracy's private functioning-part of the exercise of
freedom rather than in any sense a threat to it.
There has been general acceptance, too, of the correlative
proposition that such private associations as corporations and
labor unions are wholly subject to the "supremacy" of the State.
The wisdom of particular laws regulating their activities will
invariably be challenged on the ground that such laws constitute
undesirable invasions of the individual freedoms of the group
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members and unwarranted interferences with that contemporary
form of "free enterprise" in which these organizations have
become such an important part. But no question is raised as to
the authority of the people, acting through their government, to
adopt such laws. The proposition that the State holds a monopoly
on ultimate authority is basic in the accepted Austinian tenets of
monistic jurisprudence. Its acceptance by people generally, if
perhaps in less abstruse forms, has made the organization of these
private associations seem only a matter of social pleasure and
economic profit, devoid of any serious implications in terms of
"freedom" or "government" or "power."
There is abroad today, however, a new restlessness. There is
new questioning of the exact nature of these familiar institutions,
of their relationship to their members,, of their apparently expanding influence over the interests of others, and most particularly
of their relationship to government. As their powers increase,
the limits upon them become some way less clear.
This concern is fed by nation-wide coal or steel strikes which
seem to reveal the government as essentially powerless to keep
the economy running if one or two private groups decree that it
shall stop. Reports of oil cartels and charges of financial incest
among the country's largest corporations revive latent concerns
about the monopolistic instincts of big business units. Nor are
they allayed by a highly placed government official's identification of the interests of one large corporation and the nation.
What he says rings true, but the overtones are strangely discordant.
There is understandable uneasiness, too, when the nation's
official wage control program is halted in 1951 by the withdrawal
of the CIO and AFL members from the Wage Stabilization Board
and again in 1952 by similar action on the part of NAM and
Chamber of Commerce representatives. There are annual disclosures of new and obviously successful guerrilla attacks by
"special interest" lobbies on Congressional legislative programs.
Eyebrows raised at the report that over $100,000,000 was spent on
the 1952 election reflect realization that most of this money must
have come, even if indirectly, from well organized private groups.
There has been increased concern expressed about the growing
concentration of the power of the press, about the "bloc voting"
of various groups, and about the religious undercurrents which
come to the surface occasionally in connection with the discussion
and disposition of several of the most important issues of state.
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There is, too, less and less inclination to rationalize every
large scale exercise of private group power as being only the oak
which has grown from some acorn of individual freedom. When
General Motors Corporation and the United Automobile Workers
enter into a five-year agreement covering wages and all other
terms and conditions of employment their contract is properly
identified as being derived from a "free enterprise" practice
extending back to the time the first cordwainer in colonial Massachusetts hired his first helper. But man does not rely upon his
remote ancestry as guarantee of his ability to breathe under water
or hang by his tail from the limbs of trees. Neither does he wholly
ignore, just because they have developed in an evolutionary
manner, the facts that General Motors' total assets are now over
three and a half billion dollars, that the UAW membership numbers more than the combined population of Delaware, Nevada,
Vermont and Wyoming, and that these two organizations do now
by a process of voting and working out one agreement what used
to be done in the course of thousands of independent, "competitive" transactions.
It has become plain that it is no longer as Atlas-like individuals, but rather as members of one or more private groups, that
men (and women, but to a much lesser extent) today conduct
their most significant dealings with each other and participate
most effectively in the affairs of public government.
This development appears sufficiently broad, and the expressed concern about it sufficiently general, to warrant some
further inquiry into the scope of these various manifestations of
"private" group power, particularly into those functionings of
these private associations which seem to be related, by analogy
or by commingling, to the exercise of that "public" group power
which has been identified as so inimical to individual freedom.
II.
These private associations have all been developed through
the voluntary participation in their activities of literally millions
of people. Their growth has been enthusiastically encouraged.
They have not operated secretly or mysteriously. It has been
assumed that any power which they generate remains wholly
subject to that of "government." If now it is to be suggested that
there is a malignancy in this growth, or that it is getting out of
hand, the evidence must lie in the interrelation or cumulative
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significance of facts which have appeared innocuous and commonplace when viewed in isolation. The problem presented is in a
sense like that of whether a man can expect to cope indefinitely
with a growing animal he has lifted every day since its birth.
There are, it may be suggested, five areas of "private association" activity which are relevant to an appraisal of the effect of
this kind of group force upon individual freedoms and to a consideration of its relationship to that exercised through the agencies of "government." (i) These private associations regulate,
in varying degrees, their own members' interests and interrelationships. (ii) The activities of some of these groups have a
direct effect upon the interests and welfare of non-members. (iii)
Most of these groups participate to some extent in the elective
processes of public government. (iv) Many of them participate,
through their lobbyists and sometimes either more or less directly,
in the public legislative processes. (v) Some of them participate
in the administrative processes of public government. The first
two of these areas cover those activities of private associations
which involve the exercise of power which is at least arguably
analogous to that of "government." The last three areas involve
a commingling of "private" and "public" group forces and
processes.
(i) Regulation of Members' Interests
A person joining one of these groups obviously submits
certain of his interests to much the same form of control as that
exercised by "the Government" over the broader interests of the
whole body politic. He trades the power of self-administration
for the right to vote as to the joint administration of whatever
he and others have put into a common pool. The extent to which
the consequences to him of the voluntary "private" pooling may
or may not be said to be analogous to those of the pooling which
constitutes "government" (and which is arguably, in theory,
either voluntary or compulsory) undoubtedly varies from one
type of situation to another.
There is, on this score of internal regulatory authority, little
if any comparability between "government" and such private
associations as the American Legion, the Daughters of the American Revolution, or Rotary International. The analogy seems similarly remote, despite vigorous philosophical arguments to the
contrary, in the case of the churches. It is enough for present
purposes to recognize that there is a special element of faith-in
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the religious sense-which prompts the individual's participation
in a church group and upon which he relies for whatever restraint
may seem desirable so far as the exercise of power by the group
agency over its members' freedoms is concerned.
In the case of the economic associations, the element of
internal regulatory authority emerges in a form harder to distinguish from that of "government."
When a person buys a share of corporate stock he turns over
to the corporation a representative authority not unlike that
which the citizen delegates to his government. The interest which
he has invested becomes subject to common control in which he
shares only through his right to vote. And there could be developed, from the history of corporate finance, a record of violations
by corporations of the interests of minority (and even majority)
stockholders which could be made to suggest that group power is
as easily corrupted by "private" as by "public" stewards.
Yet any such comparison would be substantially misleading,
for there are obviously significant differences between the corporate and the government situations. It is important practically,
even if not logically, that only financial interests are subjected to
the corporation's control. There is, furthermore, a singlemindedness of purpose in normal corporation management which
gives the investor predictability as to the course it will follow.
There has already been established a set of "legal" or "governmental" restrictions upon the actions of corporate management
which perhaps do not affect the philosophical issue presented but
which are obviously relevant as a practical matter. And there
is the important fact that the stockholder-unlike the citizencan usually withdraw from participation if his dissatisfaction
prompts him to do so. It seems worth noting here, therefore, only
that there is some parallelism between governmental and corporate forms, and some evidence, too well known to restate, of the
"private" abuse of the power delegated by individuals to groups.
An infinitely closer parallel between "governmental" and
"private" regulatory control of the group members' interests
emerges in the case of the labor unions. Disproportionate emphasis in the press and in political debates upon the unions' activities
in extracting higher wages from beleaguered employers has
unfortunately concealed from public attention their probably
much more basic significance as agencies for establishing and
administering comprehensive sets of relational rules for what are
often very large employee communities.
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The organic laws for these communities are included in the
union constitutions and by-laws. These documents establish the
organization of the union government, provide for the exercise
of executive, legislative and judicial functions, and fix the terms
for membership, including taxes (or "dues"), in the employee
community. Many of them cover a great variety of matters relating to the union members' ideologies, politics and morals, going
beyond their activities as employees. By virtue of these constitutional provisions, for example, no member of the Chemical
Workers or the United Mine Workers may hold membership in
a "communist, fascist or bundist organization"; no Asbestos
Worker may be affiliated with "any agency or organization advocating the overthrow of the Government by force"; no Glass
Bottle Blower may have "leanings toward dictatorial principles."
Members of the United Packinghouse Workers are required to
obligate themselves "to defend freedom of thought, whether expressed by tongue or pen," and this constitution provides that
no member will "discriminate against a fellow worker on account
of creed, color or nationality." The Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen have prohibited "immoral practices, wife abandonment, or improper treatment of family." Other constitutions contain injunctions against "theft," "serious wrongdoing," "desertion
of family," "immoral practices," "habitual drunkenness."'
These union constitutions and by-laws are much more than
abstract statements of principle. The typical union organization
includes its own system of courts and penalties. The Typographical Union has expelled some five hundred members after "trying" them for violations of the union constitution. A Mr. Bonham
lost his membership in the Trainmen's Union when his brothers
found him guilty of adultery, and a carpenter named Steinert
paid the same price when he sold intoxicating liquor. Cecil B.
DeMille lost his union membership when he refused to pay an
assessment of $1.00 to support political action designed to defeat
anti-labor legislation pending in the California legislature.
The dominant "legislative" process in the unionized employee
community takes the form (except in the few cases where the
1. This story of union constitutional provisions and internal regulatory
procedures is expertly and interestingly told by Clyde Summers in two
articles (Disciplinary Powers of Unions; Disciplinary Procedures of Unions)
appearing in the Industrial and Labor Relations Review, at p. 483 of Vol. 3,
and p. 15 of Vol. 4 (1950). The problems arising from abuses of these powers

are discussed illuminatingly and constructively by Benjamin Aaron and
Michael I. Komroff (Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs) in 44

Ill. L. Rev. 425, 631 (1949).
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prevailing democratic pattern has been corrupted) of a majority
determination at the union meeting as to what terms and conditions of employment are considered desirable, followed by the
bargaining out of these demands with the employer. The "collective bargaining agreement" which is the end product of this
process is more like a statute or a code than a typical contract.
The "seniority clause" establishes a law of job rights which
parallels significantly the law of property rights which the courts
and legislatures have evolved. The "grievance clause" provides
complete administrative and adjudicative procedures for handling
any disputes which arise during the contract term. The usual
provision that "no employee will be discharged without just cause
as determined in the grievance process" is not basically different
from the "due process of law" protections accorded in public law.
The pension and welfare provisions in these agreements bear
obvious relationship to the Social Security laws. There is frequently included a "union shop" provision which has the effect
of making membership in the union, like citizenship in a nation,
a compulsory condition of remaining in the community.
The point is not simply that union organization and functioning offers parallels with that of public government and covers
similar subject matter. Even more significant is the fact that
there is building up around many unions that whole set of allegiances, dependencies and loyalties which are the attributes of
government and the fabric of sovereignty. The interests which
are the subject of determination and regulation within the union
organization are among those which come closest to home. Unionism offers, its members a community in which they can achieve
status, and it gives them, too, by representation, an enlarged
status in dealing with other economic groups of which they
would otherwise be only controlled satellites. The union member probably finds in his union, so far as day-to-day activities
are concerned, as much of what he would consider "governmental" functioning and authority if he thought about it as he
finds in the combined agencies of the State. He may be wrong.
But in a society where the authority of government of any kind
is recognized as based wholly on the voluntary allegiance of the
subjects of government, these loyalties are vital and significant
factors.
The strongest supporters of unionism are most acutely conscious that there has emerged in this development full evidence
of the potential power of delegatees of group force to corrupt it
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and thereby abuse the interests and freedoms of those who created it. It has been necessary for the CIO to take strong measures
to dig out the roots of communism which were spreading through
some of its international and local unions. The AFL has had to
fight hard against the dictatorial influences which have emerged
in some of its brotherhoods and against such manifestations of
this influence as are reflected, for example, in the recent disclosures of criminal practices on the New York waterfront. Some
unions have practiced racial discrimination in its most extreme
forms. The whole issue of closed-shop against open-shop has presented in sharp focus the possible clash of institutional and individual interests.
The "private government" of labor unions is of course only
one illustration of a much broader institutional development.
Even this functioning of the union has to be recognized as having
developed not as a displacement of individual employee decisionmaking but rather as an alternative to dominion over the employment relationship by the representatives of another private
group-the stockholders in the employer corporation. The broader picture of this movement towards private group controls would
have to include recognition of the implications of bar association
regulation of membership and conduct in the legal profession,
medical association dictation of doctors' practices and ethics, the
broad influence of trade associations over their membership, the
dependence of milk producers upon the determinations of dairy
cooperatives, and innumerable other similar organizational situations.
Indeed our acceptance, by membership in various private
associations, of group controls which at least resemble those of
"government" has become too commonplace to warrant belaboring. It is important that we realize how much more of it there is
than there used to be, and that it may create the same questions
we have about the dangerous powers of "the Government." But
whether it does or not, whether it is resulting in a net diminution or enlargement of individual freedoms, depends upon a
complex of factors and judgments-and upon what is meant by
"freedom."
(ii)

Regulation of Non-member's Interests

Perhaps it is in a sense only a further exploitation of the
obvious to mark the extent to which some of these private groups
have come to exercise broad influence over the interest of others
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than their members. If it is true that there has been great expansion of this influence during recent decades it is equally true that
this development reflects forces which are inherent in democratic capitalism and which we deem essential to our continued
well being.
It is the accepted basic premise of the "free enterprise" system that people's economic interests and welfare will be best
regulated not by the centralized determinative process of "government" but by the "decentralized decision-making of the market
place." So "the law" has traditionally entered much more reluctantly into the affairs of people's stores and factories than into
those of their homes. It writes marriage contracts but not those
of commerce, and affords full legal redress if one man bloodies
another's nose but virtually none if a union strikes a company
with resultant loss of thousands of man hours of earnings and
production. Where the forces of competition can operate to produce answers we have abjured the decision-making of even the
wisest solons.
It has been recognized, too, that competition exercises a certain centripetal force on the institutional organization of the
economy. "Free competition," Justice Holmes wrote, "means
combination, and . . . the organization of the world, now going
on so fast, means an ever-increasing might and scope of combination." It was in this context that he reaffirmed the generally
accepted doctrine that "free competition is worth more to society
than it costs."
It would be therefore delusory to set out here the extent to
which man's affairs are controlled by the inter-play of economic
units-and to suggest that because these effects are so great these
forces should be recognized as "governmental" in nature. The
distinction between "public" or "governmental" controls on the
one hand, and "private" or "economic" controls on the other is
not, in our system, that all major controls are the former and all
minor ones the latter. The distinction is not to be made in terms
of the quantum of the power exercised or the significance and
scope of its effects. The distinction is rather, traditionally,
between controls resulting from the deliberative decision-making
of representatives vested by people with the power to write their
decisions into binding law, and controls which represent only
the results of the inter-play of competitive forces in the market
place.
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Yet just to restate the traditional distinction in the context
of a consideration of the functioning of modern corporations and
labor unions is to realize how the moths of contemporary reality
have eaten away at the fabric of tradition. It is clear enough that
the emergence of the group economic units has not eliminated
the force of competition, that "competition" between two or three
Brobdingnagians produces some of the same effects that flow
from competition between a thousand Lilliputians, and that the
force which Professor Galbraith so expertly describes as "countervailing power" offers some of the same built-in self-administering
restraints that come from the older form of competition. 2 It is
no less clear, however, that in a very broad area of economic
activity, results which used to be almost wholly the product of
the interplay of competitive forces are now to a very substantial
degree the result of deliberative, discretionary decision-making
by the human representative of one or more non-competing
groups, which decision-making reflects at least in good part the
collective appetite or self-restraint of the members of the group
or groups involved.
Part of the evidence of this change is contained in the record
of federal legislation which starts (although there were earlier
roots) with the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and continues
on down through the long line of statutes which have resulted
in conferring broad regulatory powers on the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, the
Federal Power Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and
innumerable similar governmental agencies. These laws have been
invariably opposed in bitter diatribes against "government interference with business and the free enterprise system." Such
analysis is easy enough if it be assumed that whatever happens
outside of governmental halls is the result of the free play of
competitive forces, and that what happens within those halls is
only the fermentation of powers possessed by "the Government"-a force incarnate and disembodied from the people it is
supposed to represent.
A calmer view suggests that these laws are not themselves the
interferences with the forces of competition but that they are
rather the results of "private" interference with those forces.
These enactments have come, in every case, only after the industries affected have substituted centralized, human, group repre2. Galbraith, American Capitalism (1952).
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sentative decision-making for the old form of "decentralized
decision-making of the market place." They represent public
conclusions that if group representatives are to make decisions
affecting the economic interests and welfare of a lot of people
under circumstances in which those people have no alternatives
but to accept such decisions, the decision-makers should be the
representatives of "the public" rather than of a smaller producer
group. All of these statutes constitute, in a sense, evidence that
the power vested by individuals in "private" economic group
representatives is as likely to necessitate imposed controls as is
that power which is turned over to public agencies.
This is not, however, the whole of this picture, for it is clear
that despite all this legislation there are still operative in today's
market place forces which regulate, other than by the inter-play
of the forces of "free" competition, people's economic interests
and welfare.
There are only a very few who still pretend that "basingpoint" or "fair-trade" pricing practices are the result of the
operation of natural forces of competition roaming unbroken
and unharnessed in the market place, or that the decisions to
adopt them are more "decentralized" for having been made in
private rooms in Pittsburgh and New York instead of in public
rooms in Washington. 3 Those of us who are laymen (a synonym
here for "consumers"-and "lawyers") may rejoice, at the outbreak of a gasoline price-war, that the freedom-loving Graces of
competition have apparently made a jail break and that the
forces of good have once more shown their irrepressible superiority over those of evil. Yet when that war ends as apparently
spontaneously as it started we can only contemplate our naivete.
We are not persuaded that the great natural leveler of the market
place is responsible for our paying identical prices for all comparable leading brands of cigarettes, or for our paying our milk
dealer the same half cent increase that our neighbor pays the
same day to an entirely different dairy. We strongly suspect that
it is at the green covered tables of private "legislatures" rather
than in the halls of the mountain kings of competition that something has happened when a dozen manufacturers release almost
simultaneously a new, improved, cheaper product which someone must have thought of before everybody else did.
3. The broad implications of the development of the "basing-point" pricing
practice are graphically described in Latham, The Group Basis of Politics
(1952).
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Perhaps it begs the question to identify as "law" the fine
print which appears on insurance policies, mortgages and installment purchase agreements, and the rules printed on parking lot
signs, theatre tickets and the stub received from the redcap as
he moves away with your luggage at the railroad station. There
is, to be sure, nothing iniquitous here; life's minor commerce
would slow down deplorably if it were to become necessary to
negotiate out anew all the terms and conditions of every such
transaction. Yet the cumulative effect of that part of such rulings
as are dictated wholly by the managers of these enterprises is
obviously substantial, and they are accepted because these group
representatives have a sufficient control over the situation that
you either accept their rules or park on the street and carry your
own bag. If the rules become outrageous the likelihood is that
they will be corrected not by operation of the laws of supply
and demand operating through the forces of competition but by
a public "legislative" process remarkably similar to the private
4
process which originally produced them.
It is in the "collective bargaining" process, involving labor
unions and incorporated employers, that the replacement of the
forces of competition by a process of deliberative group determination becomes perhaps most obvious. "Bargaining" is patently
a "competition" concept, and adding the "collective" element to
the employees' bargaining power undoubtedly creates something
more like competition than what there was when a large corporation dealt with each of its employees as an individual. It is
true, too, that both the union and management bargaining committees will be governed to some extent in their negotiations by
prevailing market conditions.
Yet a public which sits through month after month of a
nation-wide coal strike and then has passed on to it in higher
prices whatever wage increase is agreed to is hard put to it to
detect the operation here of any forces except the decisionmaking of private legislators-guided very largely by their judgment as to desires and interests of their own group constituents.
The typical situation today is that those who put their labor into
what the consumer buys have set their price on that labor by
voting at a union meeting; those whose dollars went into its
manufacture have also voted, directly or indirectly, on key production and marketing decisions; there has been then an agree4. There is further development of this point in Timberg, The Decline
and Renaissance of Economic Liberties, 47 Ill. L. Rev. 147, 164-67 (1952).
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ment between representatives of these two groups, possibly another agreement or understanding between the one producer
corporation and others, and perhaps still another agreement with
the retailer that he will not sell below a certain price. The terms
upon which the product goes to the consumer are the result of
group "votes" and "agreements" and "understandings." He accepts them because he has no choice, for those who might have
offered alternative choices have decided to vest and vote their
individual power in a common pool instead of using it to compete
against each other.
In this collective bargaining situation, as in the others previously mentioned, the private groups appear to exercise, by a
process hardly distinguishable from that of "government," in a
form very similar to that of government, a force strongly resembling that of government. And not only do the decisions made
by this process affect directly the interests and welfare of individuals, both group members and non-members. They will also
affect, probably as much as will the deliberations of the Senate
and House of Representatives, all of the important national
economic issues of the future: whether, for example, there will
be inflation or deflation; how much risk capital will be invested;
whether the housing situation will be improved or worsened;
and how much unemployment there will be.
It remains to note, in this area where the layman-lawyerconsumer treads unattended by angels (or economists), one other
feature of private institutional development in the United States
which would appear to contribute to the influence of these privately organized producer groups. In virtually all other democratic nations there has emerged an effective "consumer cooperative" movement. We in this country, however, though strongly
organized in our capacity of producers, are organized hardly at
all in our capacity as consumers.
There are, to be sure, three million rural establishments
which today receive electricity from cooperatively owned and
managed enterprises. But this is a government financed program. The total volume of business (about two and a half
billion dollars) done by all the farmer purchasing cooperatives
in the country (about three thousand) in 1950 was less than that
done by Sears Roebuck and Company alone. Only in a few limited areas in two or three states has the cooperative movement
developed to a point where it represents a substantial "counter-
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vailing power" in the consumer goods market, and no place does
it even compare in its influence with the power exercised by the
co-ops in, for example, the Scandinavian countries.5
. There was a theory behind the Wagner Act of 1935 that the
consumer interest would receive organized protection, in this
battle of the economic titans, through the organization of employee groups. The fact that the standard of living for low and
middle income families has increased as much as it has since that
time offers a possible basis for arguing that this has actually
happened. Yet there is serious question whether the general
(although not universal) union emphasis upon higher wages
regardless of the effect on prices will result in continued protection to consumer interests, except possibly under the special
circumstances of the past few years.
It appears, in general, that the consumer stands today as the
subject of an economic decision-making process in which the law
of supply has been made subject to private group amendment,
but the law of demand has not. To the extent that this is true
it can be explained, to the economists' satisfaction, by substituting
Keynesian doctrine for Say's Law of Markets. Or a semblance of
consumer protection can be erected in terms of Galbraith's "concept of countervailing power," a power exercised by buyers as
well as sellers-but only indirectly by ultimate consumers. Regardless of the rationale, the consequence is that private economic groups now perform, in their own forums, the kind of
decision-making functions which were traditionally conceived of
as being characteristically "governmental." The restraining forces
of competition are at least substantially diminished, and with
that diminution there emerges increasingly the question of
whether private concentrations of group power will operate with
less resultant danger to individual freedoms than is deemed to
flow from "public," or "governmental," concentrations.
5. It is interesting to note, in this connection, the extent to which the
incorporated produced groups are willing to go in opposing the development
of cooperative consumer groups. Each of 43 private power companies and
95 other corporations contributed $500 or more in 1950 to a lobbying organization which operates under the euphemistic title of "National Tax Equality
Association" but which uses its half-million dollar budget solely to fight the
cooperatives. This money goes, for example, into the printing and distribution of chain letters, "phony bucks" and Christmas cards-all pointing out
the parasitical instincts of the co-ops. One member of Congress reported
receiving over 5,000 of the Association-inspired Yuletide greetings. See, for
more of this story and for data supporting the figures used in the text, the
Senate Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1951, pp. 1232, 1240-41, 1321, 1348,
2044-45, 2118, 2136-38, 2153, 2226, 2250-53, 2462, 2475.
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Only timidity would explain leaving this second area of private association activity and influence without noting the special
role of the newspapers. It may be doubted whether the control
exercised over people's economic affairs by any combination of
industrial corporations and labor unions poses more fundamental
questions as to the relationship between "public" and "private"
controls than those which arise in any objective appraisal of the
"power of the press."
It is wholly without regard to whatever may be the politics or
positions of any or all newspapers that notice is taken of the fact
that they represent the least restrained (except as there may be
self-restraint exercised) forces in. contemporary democratic life.
There is a whole system of checks and balances within the system
of public government, and there are forces of either competition
or countervailing power operative within the economy. But in
most, now, of the nation's communities, people are dependent
for their principal source of information upon a single, incorporated institution which is subject only to the evanescent
restraints of the laws prohibiting the publication of libelous or
obscene matter. And if it be protested that this corporation is
subject, too, to the built-in compulsion of having to make money,
it is a fair reply that experience does not suggest that this compulsion operates at all consistently in the direction of elevated
or even objective news service. 6
To note these concentrations of private power is in no way
to condemn them. No thinking person is likely to let his concern
about newspaper monopolies persuade him to recommend the
slightest restraint upon freedom of the press-or even that copywriters be required to take loyalty oaths. And any judgment that
either corporations or labor unions have become too big or too
strong requires a broad consideration of the alternatives and of
the price of achieving them.
The purpose here is simply to note the greatly increased
extent to which our affairs are now regulated by the deliberative
decision-making of private group representatives who use the
power delegated to them by others to enforce these decisions upon
a public which often has no alternative to accepting them. What
we have feared when it was identified as "government" has
6. An infinitely better qualified judgment on this whole issue is apparently expressed in a volume being released just as this article goes to press.
This book, The News in America, by Frank Luther Mott, is reviewed by
Erwin D. Canham, respected editor of the respected Christian Science
Monitor, in the Saturday Review of February 14, 1953, at p. 19.
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become now a characteristic of what we used to rely on as the
decentralized decision-making of the market place. There are
perhaps other factors which distinguish the two situations. But
there has been this now obvious change in our private processes,
and it probably makes "individual freedom" a rather basically
different thing from what it used to be.
(iii) Participationin the Public Elective Process
The picture drawn thus far has been of certain parallels
which appear to have developed between the functionings of
public and private group forces. If that were the whole of this
picture it would amount to little or nothing in terms of general
interest. There may be a good deal of expressed concern today
about the emergent power of labor unions, and some about the
increasingly obvious domination of markets by large manufacturers and chain stores, but there is a strongly soporific assumption that if any private group misbehaves too badly the public
group will spank it and set it back in its place at the table of
democratic law and order. There is comfortable confidence that
what the Sherman Act is supposed to have done to big business
can be done to any other private economic or social units which
get too big for their breeches.
It seems not unduly cynical to suggest that if the democratic
system ever collapses it will be because people, despite their distrust of government, assume, as individuals, that they are always
going to have "good" government. Those public servants who
are the most humble in the exercise of their powers are constantly appalled at the manifestations of the popular assumption
that "the Government" has its roots planted directly in Everyman's heart and mind, so that his desires feed upward by a natural
process of osmosis regardless of whether he does anything about
it or not. People's sublime confidence in "the law," which they
conceive of as something inherently fair and as being both certain and yet automatically responsive to every social change,
frightens responsible lawyers. It is probably the disease of
democracy's maturity that individuals come to take its functioning for granted.
Not so of the private associations. Their special interests
prompt them to an awareness of the protean nature of democratic
government. Their facilities are such that they can implement
their interests by participation in the elective, legislative and
administrative processes of government. It may be among their
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essential functions in a large, complex, successful democracy
that they mobilize their members into a type of participation in
public affairs, to which the alternative would be a lethal apathy
of these members as individuals.
Yet it is these same activities of these private organizations
as participants in the processes of public government which give
the fullest significance to their other functionings as "private
governments." For these are the processes of public government
upon which there is general reliance for the correction of any
abuses in the practices of the private associations. It has always
been true that we rely upon individuals-the two-legged variety-to control their own bad habits through the exercise of their
authority as participants in the processes of government. But
we recognize, as has been indicated, the resultant dangers that
special rather than general interests will be served unduly as a
consequence of this concentration of authority. There may conceivably be, in this difference between individual and group
participation in the functions of public government, the difference
too, paraphrasing Lord Acton, between the creation of that
power which tends to corrupt, and the creation of that absolute
power which corrupts absolutely.
It is in any event essential to set beside the picture of private
group functionings which parallel those of public groups, the
further picture of these private groups' participation today in the
various processes of public government.
The "evidence" as to special interest group influence on the
public elective process is largely circumstantial, at best inconclusive, but by no means inconsiderable. The cost, two elections
ago, of winning the Presidency of the United States was $7,500,000;
of losing it $13,000,000. But that was before television started to
replace the relatively inexpensive whistlestop. Every half hour
of national hookup radio-television time used in the 1952 campaign cost between fifty and one hundred thousand dollars.
Total campaign expenditures have been reliably estimated at
over $100,000,000. A few permitted glances into the activities of
the political party financial committees confirm the inescapable
inferences that this kind of money is not supplied by little contributions by little people.
It is an interesting reflection upon our national sensitivities
that we get so much more upset over the payment of a poll tax
being made a condition of some people's voting than we do over
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the fact that every citizen's influence in any election campaign
can be at least greatly augmented by his financial contributions
and those of the groups to which he belongs. There are, of course,
federal and state "Corrupt Practices" acts, theoretically designed
to limit total campaign expenditures, to restrict the size of contributions by individuals, and to prohibit contributions by corporations, national banks and labor unions. Yet all of these purported
limitations are notoriously ineffective. A dozen campaign committees can be set up (and are) so that the intended over-all
limitation will apply only to each of them separately; the
restrictions on the size of individual contributions are rendered
meaningless by permitting maximum contributions to an unlimited number of technically different campaign organizations; and
the contributions which would be illegal if they came directly
from corporations or labor unions are purified by routing them
through individuals or "political action committees."
It may well be, however, that the organized private groups
(other than the corporations) are today exercising less influence
on the public elective process by their financial contributions
than they are through the "education" and the activating of their
members as voters. This emerged, in the '40's, as an important
feature, for example, of the labor unions' programs. There has
been much talk, or had been until recently, about "bloc voting,"
and among those pretending to political sophistication there
developed the tendency to base campaigns (and predictions) on
complicated analyses of the "farm vote," the "labor vote," and
the "veterans vote." It began to be assumed that voters were
making up their minds notf as citizens of the nation but as members of various economic, service and even religious organizations.
The 1952 election has at least cast encouraging doubt on this
assumption. There are some indications that the posture of the
"communist" issue resulted in one secular-denominational alignment of voters. But it is relatively clear that this election was not
controlled by any special interest group "bloc" of votes, or by any
combination of such blocs. There is even reason to believe that
an effective antidote to the poison of large campaign contributions has been discovered in the increasing participation in the
elective process of women and younger voters-two "groups"
whose only "special interests" are in such matters as those of
the family budget and war and peace.
It is probably only coincidence, but possibly more than that,
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that a good many private organizations have recently started to
broaden out rather substantially their "social action" and educational programs. No longer are they limited to those public
issues which bear directly on the particular special interest of
the group itself. Thus, the CIO adopts at its annual convention
resolutions covering all aspects of national domestic and foreign
policy, extending even to such far-flung problems as the control
of the Suez Canal and the granting of statehood to Hawaii and
Alaska. The American Legion formally censures a Secretary of
State when it feels that his actions conflict with the "foreign
policy of the American Legion." Although the American Medical
Association continues its single-minded concentration on the issue
of socialized medicine, the American Bar Association seeks to
mobilize its members' sentiments on an infinite variety of matters,
including the breaking up of industry-wide collective bargaining
and the limitation of income tax rates to not more than twentyfive per cent.
The Council of Churches spoke out last year in the name of
Christ against universal military training, and Pope Pius more
recently sent communications to the President of the United
States regarding the Rosenberg case. The Methodist Church,
after facing a crisis precipitated when some of its bishops organized a free lance "social action" program, has now set up its own
official committee to function in this area, and has included new
sections in its Discipline which are of no lesser secular import
for being at the same time expressions of Christian ethics. A
Lutheran church conference early this year heard a proposal to
consolidate its public affairs activities so as to meet the competition of the Catholic organizations.
It is not in any way whatsoever intended here to criticize,
either directly or by implication, any of these expansions of
group interests or broadened "social action" programs. They
very probably reflect, as has already been indicated, a basic need
for an awakening of citizen interests which have become lulled
into dangerous somnolence by a feeling of individual inadequacy
to participate intelligently or effectively in today's complex of
public affairs. They are mentioned here only as illustrations of
the extent to which private associations have become important
participants in the basically essential public elective processes in
America today.
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(iv) Participationin the Public Legislative Process
It is in the story of "lobbying" that there is written probably
the fullest record of participation by private special interest
groups in the processes of public government. There is nothing
new about this story.7 Its opening chapter has to do with the
enactment by Congress of the Tariff Act of 1796. In 1857 Henry
Clay called "the meddlesome agents and lobby members" a
"sort of fourth estate in Congress." Woodrow Wilson protested
at a press conference in 1913 that no one could throw a brick
in Washington without hitting one of them. Senator Hugo Black
reported, after his committee had investigated the lobbying
practice in 1935, that: "Contrary to tradition, against the public
morals, and hostile to good government, the lobby has reached
such a position of power that it threatens government itself."
There are today in Washington, counting only those who are
officially registered as lobbyists, four of them for every one
Senator and Representative. Their budgets total tens of millions
of dollars annually. Four hundred and ninety pressure groups,
registered under the 1946 Lobbying Act, reported that they had
collected over $55,000,000 for lobbying purposes during a threeand-one-half year period ending in 1950. It is not as taxpayers
but as consumers that we pay our biggest bills for the lawmaking
we get.
The AFL admits to having spent over $800,000 trying to defeat
the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. It was drafted in substantial part,
though, by the lobbyists retained by the NAM and the Chamber
of Commerce who spent weeks closeted with members of the
House and Senate committees. Dr. Stephen K. Bailey has documented the story of how the industry and farm groups' lobbyists
took the ambitious Full Employment Bill, introduced in Congress
in 1945, and made it into the toothless Employment Act of 1946.8
The announcement in early 1952 that the AFL, the CIO, the
National Grange and the National Farmers' Union were opposing
universal military training was adequate notice of the ultimate
fate of that legislation.
The clearer the dollar sign in any bill and the more com7. It is fully traced and best told by Karl Schriftgiesser in The Lobbyists
(1951). Most of the statements appearing in the text above are based on
much fuller treatments in this volume, and upon an incomplete examination
of the reports of several of the legislative committees which have "investigated" this subject.
8. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (1947).
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plicated its provisions, the more completely is the legislative
process transformed from one of geographical representation and
party politics into one of economic group politics. Thus the tariff
laws have operated, in addition to their midwifery function for
infant industries, as a kind of bank into which the nation's consumers make deposits and from which the producer groups draw
checks. If there were any general public understanding of the
advantages derived by a few people from the loopholes drilled by
special interest group lobbyists in the capital gains sections of the
Revenue Code and in its "depletion" provisions, there would be
tea parties in every harbor in the country-protesting representation without taxation. Lobbying thrives where the cost of
benefitting one organized group handsomely can be spread by
the legislators among so many who are unorganized that none
will protest strongly.
The private group influence on legislation is probably even
more pervasive at the state than at the federal level. The 1951
session of the Illinois General Assembly was not considered in
any way extraordinary. At that session the truck lobby spent
over $200,000 trying to defeat a law which would compel truckers
to pay half as much as "the public" for using the highways.
A bill to prohibit liquor licensees from operating slot machines
was defeated by a combination of Chicago's "west-side" bloc of
representatives of hoodlum interests and by another group of
legislators who deferred to protestations from the Elks, the
Moose, the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars
that their clubroom overhead expenses and their boys' baseball
programs had to be covered from slot machine receipts. The
organized interests supporting a race-track bill sold thousands
of shares of stock to ten key legislators at ten cents a share, and
were delighted when the passage of the bill resulted in a 3,600
per cent profit to the ten farsighted public representatives.
The "agreed bill" process has become an accepted part of
Illinois' legislative practice.9 No legislative committee will seriously consider a bill involving certain basically important aspects
of industrial relations unless it has previously been approved by
the Illinois Chamber of Commerce, Manufacturers Association,
AFL and CIO. In one recent eighteen-year period only one bill
became law in Illinois over the objection of the Illinois Manufacturers Association. In that 1951 session the voting of the
9. See Steiner, Legislation by Collective Bargaining (1951).
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Illinois General Assembly followed political party lines on only
fifty out of 1,500 bills. To the other obvious partial explanations
of these figures it seems not inappropriate to add recognition of
the fact that lobbies operate on a strictly bi-partisan basis.
The lobbying practice is by no means confined to the economic groups. The Prohibition Act was a monument to the hypnotic influence of the temperance organizations upon legislative
subjects. A recent study describes the battery of "legislative
representatives" whom the churches have deployed in various
houses on K and L and M Streets in Washington. 10 Perhaps the
frankest statement of the effectiveness of lobbying, based on
notoriously successful first-hand experience, comes from the
"legislative committee" of the American Legion:
"It must be recognized that Congress does not lead in settling
questions of public, political or economic policy.. . . Legislation is literally made outside the halls of Congress by groups
of persons interested in legislation, mainly with economic
motives, and the deliberative process within Congress con11
stitutes a sort of formal ratification."
There could be no point in dwelling longer here upon the
extensiveness of the lobbying practice. Its existence, if not its
real import, is thoroughly recognized. Its obvious partial justification has led to an acceptance of its evils, although this process
of rationalization seems more than a little like condoning prostitution because of its common denominator with marriage. It is
enough for present purposes, however, simply to note that this
practice gives private organizations a form of control over agencies of government which casts serious doubt upon the practical
validity of some of the most basic theoretical assumptions concerning government's monopoly of ultimate authority.
(v) Participationin the Public Administrative Process
Comparatively little public notice has been given the extent
to which private association participation in the elective and
legislative processes of public government has been increasingly
paralleled by participation in the governmental administrative
process. There are today an infinite variety of situations in which
these associations or their representatives are entrusted by state
or federal agencies with important roles in the devising or execution of "governmental" programs.
10. Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital (1951).
11. Quoted In Duffield, King Legion 49 (1931).
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In some cases what is involved is primarily the making of
key administrative decisions by, or upon the recommendation
of, or subject to the approval of, private groups. An act of
Congress provides, for example, that certain -milk marketing
orders can be issued by the Department of Agriculture only if
they are approved by two-thirds of the milk producers who are
affected and by fifty per cent of the milk handlers. Tobacco
sellers determine what are to be the recognized market places
under the federal Tobacco Act. The Defense Production Act of
1950 provided, in effect, that the President could establish procedures for settling labor disputes only if he got prior agreement
as to the procedures from the NAM, the Chamber of Commerce,
the CIO and the AFL. The nation's raisin supply and the prices
to be charged for it are nominally determined by an agency of
the State of California, but under the California law a committee
of raisin producers makes the key decisions in this controlled
supply program. A great many state and city safety and building
codes are only codifications of specifications fixed by private
associations, and state minimum wage laws frequently provide
that minimums shall be set only upon the recommendation of
industry associations.
Occasionally the courts object to these "delegations of power."
This happened when the New York legislature gave the Jockey
Club the power to license trainers and jockeys, when the Oklahoma legislature turned state funds over to certain veterans
organizations to handle an employment agency program, and
when the Illinois General Assembly provided that masters in
chancery should consult with representatives of churches before
granting divorces. But in most instances these partnership arrangements between public and private group representatives
are upheld.
An even closer kind of power-sharing plan is worked out in
many instances by actually giving private group representatives
official status as members of public regulatory agency staffs. It is
probably the rare state or federal agency which does not today
maintain a group of "consultants" or an "advisory committee"
drawn from the staffs of the private groups affected by its regulatory program. These arrangements offer a dual advantage as
far as the governmental agencies are concerned. They get a kind
of expertness which is frequently lacking in government officers,
often not themselves specialists in their field of activity. Oppor-

19531

GOVERNMENT BY PRIVATE GROUPS

tunity is also afforded to do an educational or selling job among
representatives of the groups who will be the particular subjects
of the regulatory program.
Increasingly now it is becoming the practice to turn the
actual administration of governmental programs over to men who
take temporary leaves from their jobs as officers of the private
economic groups which are to be the subjects of control. There
were the "dollar-a-year men" in World War I. In World War II
the War Production Board was staffed almost from top to bottom
with men "loaned" by American industry. Representatives of the'
Friends' Society played a little appreciated role in the handling
of some of the conscientious objector problems which developed
during the second war. If there is disagreement about whether
the representatives of the veterans groups have gone too far in
improving thir beach heads in the Veterans' Administration,
there is less question about the contribution of the AMA representatives in the Public Health Service. The rules and regulations of state industrial safety commissions and unemployment
compensation agencies have been greatly improved by the participation of private specialists in their drafting and revision.
It would be wholly unfair to cast the slightest question upon
either the competence or the patriotism of the men and women
who have served government agencies in these capacities. They
are asked to serve, and frequently do so at substantial personal
expense and inconvenience. It may be doubted whether the wartime programs of the WPB or OPA could have been administered
without this kind of help. It is, nevertheless, equally a fact that
their inevitably hybrid status gave the associations from which
they came, and to which they were to return, a new kind of
representation in the Government.
The implications of this whole new type of participation in
the governmental process emerge most clearly in the case of the
"tri-partite" organization of such agencies as the wartime War
Labor Board and the more recent Wage Stabilization Board.
These agencies are characteristically composed of equal numbers
of members from labor, industry and whatever it is that is called
"the public." All are nominally appointed by the President, but
he names one-third of them upon the nomination of the NAM
and the Chamber of Commerce, and another third at the recommendation of the AFL and CIO.
There is a great deal to be said in support of this tri-partite
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system. It was very largely responsible for the maintenance of
four years of virtually unbroken wartime production, and for the
prevention of wage inflation during the war period. It transplanted the peace-time processes of collective bargaining into
government during the period when they could not function
privately, and thereby preserved them in better form than any
other conceivable government procedure would have.
Yet what is involved in the development of this kind of joint
public and private system of government is at least illustrated
by what happened on the Wage Stabilization Board in the Spring
of 1951. That was when the Labor Members of the WSB, all of
them top union officers, withdrew from it in protest against the
adoption of a key plank in the Government's wage stabilization
program. This withdrawal had been directed by the AFL and CIO
leaders who made up the then United Labor Policy Committee.
The result was that the nation's wage control program simply
stopped. The Director of Economic Stabilization (on leave from
his job as head of the Motion Picture Association of America)
then tried, with his assistant (on leave from his office as president of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks), to repair the
breach, working under the instructions of the Director of Mobilization and Defense (who had left his post as president of General
Electric Corporation). Some revisions of the program which were
satisfactory to all of these men in their capacity as top government officials were worked out. But this time the NAM and
Chamber of Commerce officers vetoed them, and the Government's wage stabilization program stayed on dead center. The
impasse was resolved only when a committee which included
representatives from labor, management, farm organizations, and
the sometimes seemingly ephemeral public, came up with a
recommendation to the President.
Even a wholehearted belief that "tripartitism" is a necessary
and essential form of governmental administration of certain
types of regulatory programs requires recognition that it results
in a marked shifting of the decisional center of gravity from
where it lies on an "all public" administrative body. It brings
that point very close to wherever it is that the views of the
industry and labor members of the decision-making board can
be reconciled. Quite a lot of romanticism underlies the popular
assumption that the public members on the Federal Government's tri-partite agencies can establish a program on a basis of
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their personal judgment as to what would be, independently of
the views of the industry and labor organizations, "good for the
12
country.'
The public members control, as these boards are usually set
up, only one-third of the voting power. Even when they are fully
persuaded to join their colleagues on one side of the table they
must take account of the obvious desirability of not antagonizing
those on the other side to destroy the board's program by walking
off it. (The Industry Members on the WSB did, in 1952, just
what the Labor Members had done in 1951.) This concern
reflects no interests in personal reputations, but only an awareness of administrative responsibility.
There is the further consideration that these "public members" must do their deciding without any specific frame of reference. The statute and executive order which they administer
rarely offer any more definite guidance than is contained in
such phrases as "necessary," "rare and unusual," "correction of
inequities," and the like. There is of course always the suggestion that they can and should decide their cases on the basis of
the "public interest." As set forth where? By the scholars with
whose works these public members are familiar? But by which
ones in the spectrum that spreads from Adam Smith through
Keynes to Marx? By the newspapers? It seems not unduly
cynical to suggest that the country would be at least as well
administered if more public servants read fewer newspapers.
By the man in the street? But this is a nation of hundreds of
thousands of streets and millions of men. Every man's view of
the public interest is his view of his own interest.
It is often suggested, too, that the public interest can be
isolated by looking at the consumer interest. But whenever a
public member of the War Labor Board used that argument it
brought derisive snorts from both sides of the table. The Industry Members said they represented the consumers because they
were trying to keep wages, and therefore prices, down. The
Labor Members insisted that they represented the consumers
because the fifteen million union members constitute the biggest
12. See Clark Kerr's blunt statement, based on extensive first-hand
experience, included in his paper on Governmental Wage Restraints: Their
Limits and Uses in a Mobilized Economy. 1951 Papers and Proceedings of

the American Economic Association, p. 369. It is possible to feel that Kerr
perhaps overstates the "compromising" elements in this situation but that
his description illuminates some aspects of it which have received woefully
little rational recognition.
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organized group of consumers in the country. Neither argument
was wholly frivolous. The "public interest" is infinitely clearer
to someone who can use that phrase to dignify his own view than
it is to one who must seek to give it more objective content.
It is also relevant here that even assuming that there is a
relatively clear "public interest" in a particular situation the
"public" members on these boards can expect to receive not the
slightest help from the owners of that interest either in connection with formulating it or later in connection with supporting
a decision based on it. When a body such as the Wage Stabilization Board recesses for caucuses, the industry and labor members phone the AFL, CIO, NAM and Chamber of Commerce
headquarters; the public members ask of each other "what do
you think," and then they look out the windows, and up at the
stars. What newspaper editorial comment there is will usually
seem to lean so far one way or the other that it cannot be relied
upon as a "public" testament. Calls from Congressmen are invariably traceable directly to one or the other parties to a particular
case, and rarely if ever sound much like the voice of the public.
There was the sorry spectacle, after the 1952 Steel case in the
Wage Stabilization Board, of one Congressman's indicting the
members of that board publicly as being in the pay of labor
unions. Here was the classical half-truth indeed, for the facts
were that these men had in prior private life done arbitration
work for which they were paid jointly by the unions and the
companies who had hired them for this service.
It should be added that there is probably a direct relationship between the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the "public"
members on these tri-partite agencies and the strength or weakness of the chief executive and the majority party in Congress.
There is reason to believe that not only in the tri-partite agencies,
but also in the case of those regulatory boards which are manned
entirely by "public members"-the FCC, the CAB, the ICC, the
FTC, the SEC, and others-the regulated industries manage to
exert excessive influence over the govrnmental administrative
agency which is regulating them to about the same degree they
have achieved influence in the White House and on Capitol Hill.
It seems a fair summarization of this private group participation in the public administrative processes that it represents today
probably at least as great an influence as that which is exercised
in connection with either the public elective or legislative proc-
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esses. There is a rapidly increasing amount of it. It can by no
means be considered all "bad." Much of it seems unquestionably
good. But it does pose some new questions as to the channels
which are best suited to carry the viewpoints of individuals into
the decision-making forums of Government. More and more of
those being used are marked "Private"-for dues paying, rather
than tax-paying, members only.
III.
It would be a reasonable reaction to this description of some
of the functionings of democracy's private organizations that it
amounts to little more than an inventory of the familiar and the
commonplace. These associations have become an integral and
essential part of democracy's structure. Their powers are not
enlarged by analogizing them to those of government, and any
expression of surprise at the extent of pressure group politics
seems at this date a little like getting excited about discovering
that a lifetime has been spent speaking prose.
There is something a little sobering, nevertheless, about the
realization that the present state of affairs is so markedly different from what it was only a few years ago, that its salient features
conform so poorly to accepted tenets of political theory and legal
doctrine, and that it would offer so much sustenance for the
apocalyptic gloom of those philosophers who have warned that
democracy will be buried in the graveyard of syndicalism. It is
easy enough to set aside, in the light of three centuries of actual
experience, Hobbes' admonition, when he launched the Leviathan,
that any "private societies" which might ever be allowed to
develop would work within the body politic like "wormes in the
entrayles of a natural man." It is harder, though, to disregard
the confirmation which time has given some of Veblen's and
Bentley's cynicisms of fifty years ago. They would see in this
record-of industry-wide strikes, closed shops, reported oil cartels,
basing point and "fair-traded" prices, political pulpits, virulent
lobbies, monopolistic newspapers, devastating depressions aggravated by controlled prices and production-the inevitable fruits
of the planting in democracy's soil of the dragon's teeth of pluralism. It is only good sense to realize that social architects, no less
than nuclear physicists, could produce on democracy's stage tragic
reenactment of that final scene in Capek's play where Rossum's
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Universal Robots become masters of the laboratory and are
marching inexorably, as the curtain falls, upon their creators.
So familiarity with the present day functionings of even
essential institutions will not be permitted to breed contempt for
their possible implications. Nor will we advisedly, on the other
hand, exaggerate such implications, or jump to the immoral conclusion that they doom democracy to inevitable destruction. It
must be left for another occasion to attempt any broad appraisal
of the net significance of the developments which have been
traced in this paper. A few comparatively obvious and circumscribed conclusions may, however, be simply adumbrated here.
There appears, in the first place, no justification for considering the emergence of strong private groups as in any way aberrational, or as indication that democracy has been diverted
from its natural course. The personal devil theory, for example,
which finds in such organizations simply reflections of the egos
and lusts of Morgans, Vanderbilts and John L. Lewises, only confuses whatever problems of diagnosis or prognosis may be presented. Indeed the clearest impression from a review of this
development is that it represents an inevitable concomitant of
large, "free-economy size" capitalistic democracy.
Insofar as the social (as distinguished from economic) private
organizations are concerned, this emergent "groupism" appears to
have obvious sociological and psychological as well as political
explanations. It seems not amiss to suggest, in passing, that
lawyers probably err dangerously when they disregard the
knowledge of these other disciplines in their formulations and
applications of such doctrines as those of sovereignty-and even
of property rights. There has been a tendency to ignore the
implications here of such simple facts as that there are now over
150,000,000 of us, that we are gregariously inclined, that there is
a greater desire for group status than the offices of public government can possibly satisfy, and that the apparently national
instinct to form an organization around every impulse for pleasure or betterment is bound to produce at least a few chain reactions which become self sustaining.
Today's highly complex circumstances probably require,
furthermore, some organized mobilization, or at least stimulation,
of people's talents for democratic citizenship. It is perhaps a
wholly personal view that the League of Women Voters offers,
in this connection, a model of desirable divorcement of special
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from general interests. Yet the enlarged social action programs
of other organizations, formed around more specialized interests,
may be fairly expected to yield a net profit in terms of greater
individual participation in public affairs.
As for the economic groups, corporations and labor unions
seem best understood as inevitable institutional outgrowths of
the industrial revolution. The exploitation of the potentialities
of machines required the expenditure of more capital than single
individuals cared to risk. So joint investment was permitted by
law and there was added the legal blessing of "limited liability."
Perhaps there was not full realization originally of the extent to
which the incorporation of employers would produce a resultant
diminution in the bargaining power of individual employees, or
of how the factories and machines and assembly lines would
dwarf the men who tend them and erode their status as human
beings. Labor unions developed primarily as an institutional
counteraction whereby the collective strength of associated people was brought into a balance (whether equal, or more or less
than equal) against the collective strength of associated dollars.
If it appears alarming that certain functionings of private
economic organizations have become very much like those of
public agencies it must also be realized that such functioning is
in many instances the alternative to an increased exercise of
"governmental" authority. The severest critics of the collective
bargaining process, of strikes, and of big labor unions, seem to
assume that if these were eliminated there would be then
restoration of former "managerial prerogatives." This is only
wistfulness, and expressing it in terms of devotion to the principles of "free enterprise" brings it no nearer the realm of
reality. The Social Security Act of 1935 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (as well as the English Ordinance of
Labourers of 1349) illustrate what happens when serious imbalance develops in the relative bargaining power of employers and
employees and if there is no private mechanism for fixing terms
and conditions of employment which most people in a nosecounting society consider fair. They may be.fixed for a time by
the stronger private force, but before long the agencies of Government will step in and "repair" whatever abuses are considered to
have developed.
This point becomes clearer if it is recognized that one incident of an employer's hiring of thousands of men and women is
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the creation of a need for "governing" his relationships with
them and theirs with each other, a need for determining "job
rights." Perhaps this seems to beg the question. It is indeed arguable as a matter of logic that there is no matter here of "rights"
at all, or that the determination of these "job rights" is clearly
among the prerogatives of the owner of the "property rights" to
the soil upon which the work is performed. But this, too, is only
wistful thinking. Whether for better or for worse, that majority
of the citizens of the world's democracies who are employees
have rejected the idea that "ownership (of property) for power"Hobhouse's phrase for what is involved in corporate ownershipincludes the power of autocratic control over the terms and
conditions of all work performed on it. Employee insistence on
sharing in that control has been recognized in every society in
any way similar to our own. In France and other continental
countries this recognition has been enforced by the statutory
establishment of "works councils." In West Germany there has
been the recent adoption by law of the principle of Mitbestimmung (codetermination), so that employees in the iron, steel
and mining industries are now given equal representation with
stockholders on corporate boards of directors. The contemplation
of these alternatives gives new meaning to the accomplishment
of American labor and management in working out, in their
100,000 collective bargaining agreements, a private law of job
rights.
Even in the consideration of the industry-wide, national emergency strike situations-which seem the worst and most unconscionably wasteful of the manifestations of private power-there
is the necessity of recognizing that the only likely alternative to
less "private government" is more "public government." This is
borne out by the record of the wartime interposition of governmental dispute settlement in this country, by the resort to a
comprehensive system of governmental compulsory arbitration
in Australia and New Zealand, and by the establishment of the
Labor Courts in the Scandinavian countries.
So it seems a necessary part of any appraisal of the developing pluralism of the democratic institutional structure to realize
that the emergence and functioning of these strong private
groups has been part of the filling of clearly felt needs. They
have appeared and developed in the manner rather of Topsy
than of Minerva. As the increasing complexity of the society
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and economy has presented new necessities of "governing" people's relationships we have both instinctively and deliberatelyand for proven good reason-drawn back from unlimited expansion of the role of public government. Much of the present functioning and authority of these private associations is resultant
proof of the fact that in the laws of man's self-government, no
less than in those of nature, a vacuum is intolerable. It will not
help in the analysis of this development to assume, under the
influence of nostalgia, that the choice is always between something being done by private groups or by individuals (or not at
all). The lesson of experience is that the choice is more usually
between something being done by little "private governments"
or by big public ones.
There seems at the same time no justification whatsoever
for uncritical acceptance, just because it is understandable, of a
development which is bringing some of the most basic democratic
premises into serious question. It appears clearly from a review
of the history and present status of democratic institutionalism
that there has been recently an extraordinarily sharp acceleration in the concentrations of power in private group organizations. This acceleration parallels the more generally recognized
(and criticized) expansion during the past twenty years of the
functions of public government. There must be further inquiry
into whether there is a reciprocal relationship here and as to
what is cause and what effect. That there is more than ordinary
significance in the recent institutional evolution is suggested, too,
by the coincidental emergence and wide acceptance of a basically
revised theoretical economic explanation of capitalism's functioning.
There is substantial evidence that these accelerated developments are being rationalized, politically and popularly and
"legally," on the basis of increasingly anachronistic premises.
The old assumptions as to the restrictions which operate, or can
easily be made to operate, upon private exercises of group
authority, appear particularly rusted by the oxidizing process of
changing circumstance. It is still being asserted that adequate
restraints lie, on the one hand, in the laws of the market placewhich these groups have already shown themselves capable of
amending; and, on the other, in the regulatory actions of "the
Government"-over whose processes these organizations are exercising an ever-increasing control. Perhaps the greatest doubt
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arising from this record is as to "the law's" continuing reliance
upon its assumptions of exclusive sovereignty and upon the traditional conception of its task as primarily that of implementing
relationships between men and women who stand alone except
for their membership in the community of the State.
More generally, and most basically, this record appears to
confirm those doubts, mentioned at the outset, as to whether our
concern about the threat of group force to individual freedoms
has been broad enough. It seems to emerge as a relatively obvious
proposition, not just of logic, but now of actual experience, that
the danger of group force does not depend upon whether the
agency exercising it is called "government" or a "labor union" or
a "corporation" or a "momewrath"; it depends rather upon the
degree of counter-force which operates against it. All that we
have long recognized about the concentration in "the Government" of power delegated by individuals begins to appear
equally true of concentrations of power resulting from similar
delegations to any agencies. The question is not who has the
power, or whether his use of it is an exercise of "sovereignty" or
of "free enterprise." Private group agents manifest no more self
restraint than do public group agents. The only question, in
either case, is what outside restraints are operative.
"The Government" still stands clearly in this record as the
outstanding custodian of such group force, to which there is no
organized counter-force in any way comparable. And there is
disturbing evidence of an apparently increasing exercise of this
power at the expense of individual freedoms. Business men are
pressed even harder to keep their heads above engulfing waves of
"regulations," to stay abreast of mounting demands for reports
and returns which seems to assume their dishonesty. Now, too,
for the first time in the nation's history, voices which are no less
loyal for being critical are being stilled by the indiscriminate fists
of McCarthys and McCarrans made bullies by the power of their
offices.
f,
The increased participation of the private groups in governmental processes might seem to promise checks against encroachments upon individual liberties. This excuse is used to justify
many of their programs. But there seems almost greater evidence
to the contrary. It is only certain individuals whose freedoms each
group champions, and the fine theory that their pressures will
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act healthily against each other disregards such plainer facts as
the propensities of lobbyists for logrolling.
Yet the more relevant point here is that there has developed
now this other set of "private" group force concentrations, and
that so far as can be seen their habits are no different from those
of agencies of public government. The situation is not one, except
in rare instances, of absolute, unchecked, private group force.
This makes appreciation of the problem harder, for there can
always be an argument made in terms of some counter-force
being operative, of there being some competitive force at work,
or some semblance of "governmental" control. But the point,
clearly no less real for being one of degree, is that to whatever
extent there is enlarged private centralization of delegated group
power, and to whatever extent outside restraints upon such
power are diminished, the consequences appear on scrutiny little
different from those flowing from concentrations of power in "the
Government." The rest of the point is simply that private concentrations of group power are today being enlarged and the
restraints upon them diminished at a rate unparalleled in this
nation's history.
Here is no invitation to even the slightest heresy. Powerful
private organizations must be recognized, under present circumstances, as having some of the same essentiality to capitalism
and democracy as do the agencies of government. But no institution has any significance except as a means to the end of individual satisfactions, and of these we count freedom the greatest,
both for itself and for what it in turn produces. It is devotion to
the basic democratic ideal which demands emphasis today upon
the increasing evidence that individual freedom can be either
enhanced or destroyed by either public or private group force.
Not fear, but caution, comes from the realization that democracy's
destruction in other nations has been less a consequence of an
incumbent government's tyranny than of some private group's
uncontrollable ascendancy.

